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Summary 
Comparative welfare state research has argued for some time that it makes a difference in 
regards to the specific welfare state design whether Social Democrats or Christian 
Democrats are in government. The theory is based on the fact that historically the social 
policy aims of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have differed. But can these 
policy differences still be assumed after almost three decades, which have been 
characterised by a discourse about necessary welfare state retrenchment, adaptation, and 
modification? More specifically, in which way have ‘new’ ideas altered the social and 
economic policy concepts? We hypothesise that the differences among the two welfare state 
parties in formerly conservative welfare states have largely faded away. Moreover, we 
argue that, in the meantime Social Democrats as well as Christian Democrats pursue a more 
or less common liberal-communitarian approach in welfare state policies in these countries. 
Our study is based on an in-depth analysis of programmatic approaches by Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands since 1975. 
Based on Christian-Democratic and Social Democratic ideal types, we pay special attention 
to the development of employment, social security, and family policies.  
Zusammenfassung 
Ein grundlegender Befund der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung bestand lange 
Zeit darin, dass die spezifische Ausgestaltung von Wohlfahrtsstaaten in hohem Maße 
dadurch bestimmt wird, ob diese von sozialdemokratischen oder christdemokratischen 
Parteien regiert werden. Historisch unterschieden sich die wohlfahrtsstaatlichen 
Zielsetzungen von Christdemokraten und Sozialdemokraten deutlich. Können diese 
Parteiendifferenzen auch nach drei Jahrzehnten als gegeben vorausgesetzt werden, die 
durch einen Diskurs über die Notwendigkeiten wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Einschränkungen, der 
Anpassung und Modifizierung gekennzeichnet waren? In welcher Weise haben „neue“ 
Ideen die sozial- und wirtschaftspolitischen Konzepte der Parteien verändert? Unsere 
Hypothese ist, dass die Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Wohlfahrtsstaats-Parteien in 
ehemals konservativen Wohlfahrtsstaaten weitgehend abgeschmolzen sind. Zudem 
verfolgen sowohl Sozialdemokraten als auch Christdemokraten in diesen Ländern 
zunehmend einen liberal-kommunitaristischen Ansatz wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik. Die 
Studie basiert auf einer eingehenden Analyse der Programmatik von Sozialdemokraten und 
Christdemokraten in Österreich, Deutschland und den Niederlanden seit 1975. Ausgehend 
von christ- und sozialdemokratischen Idealtypen liegt der Fokus der Untersuchung auf 
Entwicklungen in den Feldern der Beschäftigungspolitik, der Politik der sozialen Sicherung 
sowie der Familienpolitik. 
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1 Introduction 
Comparative welfare state research has argued for some time that welfare state design 
varies according to whether Social Democrats or Christian Democrats are in government. 
The theory is based on the fact that historically the social policy aims of Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats have differed. But can these policy differences still be assumed 
after almost three decades of welfare state retrenchment, adaptation, and modification? We 
hypothesise that the differences between the two welfare state parties in formerly 
conservative welfare states have largely faded away. Specifically, we argue that Social 
Democrats as well as Christian Democrats in these countries pursue a more or less common 
liberal-communitarian welfare state policy. 
Our study is based on an in-depth analysis of social policy approaches of Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands since 1975. Based on 
previous party differences we pay special attention to the development of employment, 
social security, and family policies. Our paper proceeds in three steps: First, we will discuss 
the theoretical and methodological framework. Second, we present the findings of our three 
cases, before finally addressing the issues in a comparative perspective. 
2 Theoretical  and  Methodological  Framework1 
Most comparative research is conducted across welfare state regime boundaries (cf. Esping-
Andersen 1990), revealing very little about the aims of political parties within specific 
welfare state regimes. Taking this as our starting point, we focus on the policy preferences 
of political parties within the conservative regime. According to the power resource and the 
parties matter theories we would expect very different policy approaches by the various 
political parties.2 The conservative regime cluster can generally be distinguished from the 
other regimes by the prevalence of two welfare state parties, i.e. Social Democrats and 
Christian Democrats, competing over the ‘right’ welfare approach, and it is these which 
provide the focus of our study.  
Among the cluster of conservative welfare states we have chosen to analyse Austria, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. These countries are very similar in 
many dimensions (Alber 1998) and therefore ideal for a most-similar-case design.3 Most 
                                                   
1  This section largely draws on Seeleib-Kaiser 2002. 
2  For the classical argument see Hibbs (1977). The various different approaches in regards to the 
influence of Social Democracy on the welfare state are discussed by Shalev (1983); for a more recent 
review of the literature see Kersbergen (2003). For an analysis of the relationship between Christian 
Democracy and the welfare state see Kersbergen (1995). 
3  Using the Netherlands as an example of a conservative welfare state is controversial (Goodin et al. 
1999; Castles/Mitchell 1993; Visser/Hemerijck 1997; Esping-Andersen 1990; Cox 2001). However, 
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scholars interested in the comparative influence of political parties on welfare state 
development either categorise parties according to nominal characteristics or base their 
analysis on expert judgements (cf. Huber/Stephens 2001; Garrett 1998); the ideational 
positions of the parties per se are rarely scrutinised. Moreover, recent research on party 
politics primarily concentrates on the various Third Way approaches of Social Democratic 
parties in Western Europe (cf. Merkel 2001; Bonoli/Powell 2004). Although the Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats are the main competing parties in many continental-
European countries, ‘Third Way’ discussions often assume a dichotomy of Liberal and 
Social Democratic parties (Giddens 1998), thus largely neglecting the relationship between 
the ‘new’ Social Democracy and Christian Democratic parties. Hence, what might appear 
as a ‘new’ Social Democratic approach could indeed constitute a convergence of Social 
Democrats towards Christian-Democratic policy positions.  
Based on a screening of quantitative data by the Manifesto Research Group (see Budge et 
al. 2001) the support for welfare state expansion has dropped in all our three cases. 
Furthermore, the preference for Keynesian demand management has declined significantly. 
In 1998, none of the parties sampled called for a Keynesian policy. All these developments 
might be interpreted as an increased emphasis on liberal positions (see appendix).  
However, these results are very crude and need to be complemented and contextualised. 
Qualitative content analysis of the policy positions formulated in the party programmes 
over the past three decades enables us to question, whether the parties in power still want to 
make a difference. The categories used for the content analysis are based on ideal types that 
draw on historical experiences and are derived from an analysis of secondary literature. We 
differentiate between three ideal social policy trajectories, the Social Democratic, the 
Christian-Democratic, and the liberal paradigm. These ideal types will constitute the 
reference points for our empirical analysis.4 
Contrary to the widespread conventional wisdom, the prime aim of social democracy 
cannot accurately be characterised as ‘politics against markets’ (Esping-Andersen 1985). 
The implicit acceptance of the market and the capitalist economy during the 1950s and 
1960s was the result of a protracted transformation of social democracy that began with the 
‘revisionism’ of the late 19th century. Rather than attempting the comprehensive 
transformation of the capitalist economy, the two core aims of Social Democratic parties 
were the achievement of macro-economic efficiency and social justice within a full-
employment economy. A (Keynesian) full-employment policy,5 state intervention via 
universal social programmes to minimise the social risks associated with an industrial 
society, a redistributive tax system and regulated markets were key policy instruments. 
                                                                                                                                                     
the dominance of the male-breadwinner model and corresponding conservative family policies are 
undisputed and in our view a key element of the Dutch welfare state in the ‘golden era’, which 
positions it more clearly within the group of conservative welfare states.  
4  Although similar our categories and variables are not identical with the approach developed by Esping-
Andersen (1990). 
5  Korpi and Palme (2003) explicitly make the argument that full employment constituted part of the post-
WW II welfare state design. 
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Moreover, the welfare state was designed by Social Democrats to absorb the negative 
effects of the market and to promote a higher degree of social justice. It was perceived as 
the primary responsibility of the state to secure individuals against social risks (Sassoon 
1996; Huber/Stephens 2001; Moschonas 2002).  
Although Christian-Democratic parties can also be characterised as welfare state parties, 
their approach to social policy differs significantly. The role of the state according to 
Christian Democrats can be summarised as follows: 
The ideal state is a welfare state and ‘its responsibilities consist in defining and 
enforcing the responsibility of others - individuals or social groups - rather than 
providing services itself’. … An institutional commitment to full employment, for 
instance, is at odds with the tenet of the enforcement of ‘self-responsibility’. 
(Kersbergen 1995: 181) 
Hence, the centre of the Christian-Democratic world view can best be described by the 
relatively strong emphasis on responsibilities versus rights as well as on the family and 
other social groups vis-à-vis the society and the state - guided by the core principle of 
subsidiarity. Social services provision is ideally via the family and other communitarian 
institutions, and social transfer benefits are based on the insurance principle, i.e. extending 
market inequalities into the realm of social benefits. The promotion of property ownership 
among workers is a core policy in achieving the Christian-Democratic aim of social 
inclusion. Employment policy is largely perceived as the responsibility of the various social 
partners (Kersbergen 1995: 174-191; Hartwich 1998; Huber/Stephens 2001). 
This trajectory clearly deviates from the liberal approach to social policy, where the main 
instrument of welfare is the market. Public social transfers and social services are in 
principle only provided on a means-tested basis for the truly needy. Liberal parties build on 
promoting individual capabilities within society with limited government intervention. The 
promotion of formal equal opportunity, in contrast to equal outcomes, and public education 
are the main social policy instruments (Goodin et al. 1999: 21-55). 
Irrespective of the benefits the distinction of these ideal policy trajectories had for 
comparative analyses in the past, we cannot assume that the differences have stayed more 
or less constant over the past three decades. Moreover, it largely seems to be an open 
question as to whether parties still want to make a difference in welfare state development. 
From a quantitative perspective Huber and Stephens (2001) and Kittel and Obinger (2003) 
have found evidence of a declining significance of political parties. 
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Table 1:  Ideal Social Policy Aims and Instruments of Political Parties 
 Social Democrats Christian Democrats Liberals 
Political Aims Full employment, 
social justice and 
autonomy; economic 
efficiency 
Promotion of social 
stability; social 
capitalism; insurance 
against social risks  
Economic growth, 
equal opportunity, 
poverty reduction 
Overall role of 
the state in the 
economy 
Central and 
comprehensive 
Secondary to the 
responsibility of social 
groups (principle of 
subsidiarity) 
Rudimentary  
Economic and 
employment 
policies 
Keynesian demand 
management; public 
ownership; economic 
planning; co-
ordinated wage 
policies; strong 
commitment to work 
through 
comprehensive active 
labour market 
policies 
No commitment to full 
employment (primarily 
the responsibility of 
social partners); highly 
regulated dismissal 
protection policies; 
economic policy 
geared to price stability   
No direct 
interference of the 
state in addition to 
anti-trust and anti-
discrimination 
policies 
Social Policies Universalism, social 
citizenship, vertical 
redistribution through 
transfer and tax 
system 
Social Insurance, 
primarily inter-
temporal redistribution, 
promotion of property 
ownership among 
workers and social 
policy arrangements 
between social partners  
Market, public 
means-tested 
programmes for 
the poor 
Family 
Policies 
Support of individual 
family members; 
promoting equal 
opportunity through 
provision of social 
services 
Support of the family 
as an institution; 
traditional division of 
labour; emphasis on 
the family as a social 
service provider 
No policy, private 
matter 
Cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2002. 
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Qualitative research on programmatic change has addressed the issue whether Social-
Democratic parties have turned to ‘neo-liberal’ policies (see Crouch 1997; Meyer 1999) or 
pursue multiple Social Democratic approaches (Merkel 2001). Methodologically this 
research often neglects the existence of Christian-Democratic parties in continental Europe. 
However, to be able to evaluate whether the two welfare state parties still want to make a 
difference in welfare democracies, we have to analyse their programmatic positions in 
comparative perspective. Theoretically, a number of programmatic developments in regard 
to the relationship between Christian and Social Democrats are possible: a) the continuance 
of differences, b) policy convergence, and c) policy diffusion. By policy diffusion we 
envision a development, which eventually leads to the dissolution of a particular party 
family. 
Methodologically, our analysis of change and continuity is informed by a conceptualisation 
proposed by Peter Hall (1993). He distinguishes between ‘first’, ‘second’, and ‘third order 
changes’. Hall defines a first order change as a change in the setting of policy instruments 
according to changed circumstances. A second order change is defined as a change of 
instruments, while the overall aims of a policy remain the same. Finally, we can speak of a 
third order change if the overall aims and instruments of a policy are newly defined. 
Finally, our study of policy positions is based on a primary analysis of election platforms, 
economic and social policy programmes, as well as basic party manifestos, dating from the 
1970s to present. During the analysis, the three ideal types developed above will be used as 
categorical reference points, allowing us to ascertain continued party differences, 
convergence or diffusion along the various policy dimensions. 
3  Case Studies 
3.1  The Austrian Case 
The Austrian Peoples’ Party’s (ÖVP) ideological approach towards the role of the state has 
traditionally been guided by the principle of subsidiarity (ÖVP 1972: 194 f.). Yet this 
overall positive, although limited conceptualisation of the public sphere, has undergone a 
process of ‘liberalisation’, culminating in the perception that the private sector is superior 
to public activities (ÖVP 1990: 9). Subsequently, the state’s role in economic policy during 
the 1990s was largely confined to guaranteeing competitiveness in the market sphere 
through anti-trust legislation and industrial as well as regional policy (ÖVP 1995b: 65). 
In contrast the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) traditionally promoted a strong 
and comprehensive state. State intervention was considered to be indispensable to counter 
the recurrent crises of the capitalist economy (SPÖ 1978: 158f.). However, this 
conceptualisation fundamentally changed during the 1980s and 90s. In its 1990 election 
programme, the party advocated abolishing “outdated” market regulations (SPÖ 1990: 17). 
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In the mid 1990s, the role of the state was explicitly redefined and restricted to regulatory 
policy in addition to its role as owner of nationalised companies (SPÖ 1994: 8; 1995: 6).6 
Four years later the Social Democrats finally stressed the superiority of the market, limiting 
state intervention to those exceptional circumstances that cannot be resolved by the private 
sector (SPÖ 1998: 8 ff.). Thus, the conception of the overall role of the state merged 
towards the Christian-Democratic ideal type. Furthermore, the Social Democrats tended to 
emphasise the concept of equal opportunity, whereas in the past the principle of equality of 
outcomes had dominated the Social Democratic thinking around social justice (SPÖ 1978: 
142; 1998: 5f.; 1994: 15). In its 1998 party programme, the SPÖ even accepted limited 
income inequality to the extent that it would not negatively affect participation within 
society (SPÖ 1998: 9).  
3.1.1  Economic and Employment Policies 
Regarding economic and employment policies, moderate party differences between ÖVP 
and SPÖ characterised party competition in the mid-70s. The central aim of both parties 
was to guarantee full employment, promote economic growth, secure price stability and 
increase the standard of living. Both parties preferred policy instruments based on a 
combination of demand-oriented and supply-side-oriented measures. This approach was 
coined “Austrokeynesianism” (Winckler 1988; Unger 2001). Contrary to the expectations 
derived from our ideal type, the Austrian Christian Democrats did not call for wage 
restraint or the privatisation of nationalised companies (ÖVP 1972: 200f.; 1975: 6ff.), nor 
did they reject Keynesian deficit spending or the expansion of active labour market 
programmes to combat unemployment (ÖVP 1975: 7; 1978a: 19ff.).  
Since the late 1970s, however, the economic and employment policy positions of the ÖVP 
have changed significantly. Private consumption and entrepreneurial investment have 
increasingly been perceived as preconditions for economic growth, international 
competitiveness, and a high level of employment. This change of economic policy was 
symbolised in the 1978 economic programme by the explicit rejection of direct state 
intervention to promote employment and a call for budget consolidation. In the view of the 
ÖVP, increasing public resources to promote employment would cause a higher tax burden 
and thereby negatively affect economic growth and international competitiveness (ÖVP 
1978a: 6 f.). The fiscal consolidation measures were justified by the argument that such an 
approach was necessary to preserve the state’s future capacity to intervene in the economy 
(see e.g. ÖVP 1995b: 13 ff.). Overall, the ÖVP increasingly emphasised the need to 
                                                   
6  The public sector has traditionally played a strong role in Austrian economics. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the largest industrial and financial companies were nationalised in Austria. In the 
late 1970s firms in public ownership employed about 9 per cent of all employees, amounting to 25 per 
cent of employment in manufacturing. If employment in the railways and postal services as well as 
public employees are included, the employment share under public control rises to about 28 per cent 
(Guger 1998: 47). 
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improve the supply-side and the business climate. (ÖVP 1986: 4 ff.; 1990: 8 ff.; 1994: 16 ff. 
1995a: 10 ff.; 1995: 73 ff.; 1999: 5 ff.; 2002: 19 ff.).   
While initially the SPÖ emphasised macroeconomic planning, a large nationalised sector, 
the promotion of domestic demand by an expansive fiscal policy, a monetary policy 
directed at full employment as well as the reduction of working hours and measures of 
active labour market policy (SPÖ 1975: 16f.; 1978: 158 ff., 200ff.), their policy positions 
have increasingly shifted towards the promotion of economic competitiveness. The 
programmatic position of economic policy has changed from “preserving full employment” 
(SPÖ 1979: 7) to “adding new jobs and fighting unemployment” (SPÖ 2002: 2). Although 
the Social Democrats acknowledged the dramatic changes in the international economy and 
the long-term negative effects of a current account deficit (SPÖ 1981), they initially 
continued to prefer classical Social Democratic policy instruments (SPÖ 1983). In their 
view, international economic crises confirmed the inherent instability of the capitalist 
economy and the responsibility of the state to correct the malfunctions of the system. 
However, to overcome the perceived loss of national economic autonomy the Social 
Democrats proposed increased international cooperation (SPÖ 1975: 13 ff.; 1978: 147, 158 
ff.; 1979: 7; 1981: 5). During the mid-80s this changed fundamentally, prompted by 
concern that the Austrian economy could lag behind in global economic development (SPÖ 
1986: 3 f.). Consequently, increasing the international competitiveness of Austrian 
companies was perceived as crucial for the preservation and creation of jobs (SPÖ 1986: 4).  
While expansionary fiscal policies and a large nationalised industrial sector were to be used 
to achieve the goal of full employment until the mid-80s, the party has explicitly aimed to 
consolidate the state budget ever since (SPÖ 1986: 6). Furthermore, the Social Democrats 
started to promote the “reorganisation” of nationalised companies and refused to further 
increase their subsidies, thereby restricting the role of the nationalised sector as a 
macroeconomic instrument (SPÖ 1986: 4f.; 2002). In addition, the economic focus of the 
SPÖ shifted in a number of small steps towards supply-side measures like the promotion of 
investment, industrial and regional policies, active labour market policies, and a reduction 
of working hours (SPÖ 1979: 8; 1983: 25; 1986: 11; 1990: 18; 1994: 15; 1998: 9). They 
even called for capital income tax reductions. Finally, in order to avoid further increases in 
income taxation and social insurance contributions while at the same time bolster social 
insurance revenues, the SPÖ has promoted the introduction of ecological and “machine” 
taxes for capital-intensive companies (Wertschöpfungsabgabe) since the mid-1990s (SPÖ 
1998: 9 f.; 1999: 6).  
3.1.2  Social Policies 
The preferred social policy instruments of the SPÖ and the ÖVP differed substantially in 
the mid-1970s, due to different conceptualisations of social justice. The Social Democrats 
aimed to equalise income differentials through a solidaristic wage policy, a redistributive 
fiscal policy, the provision of public services as well as transfer payments to people with 
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low incomes. Furthermore, the SPÖ aimed to replace the existing social insurance system, 
which was highly fragmented along occupational lines, with a centralised system, including 
uniform benefit and eligibility standards for the various occupational groups (SPÖ 1978: 
161; 174). In contrast the ÖVP did not propose to reduce income differentials, instead 
putting its main focus on the promotion of property ownership. Moreover, it was committed 
to the existing social insurance structure, which built on the ‘achievement’ principle, i.e. 
extending wage differentials into the realm of social transfers. A core element in their 
overall conceptualisation of social policy was the promotion of self-responsibility. Hence 
they called for public support of private social policy arrangements (ÖVP 1972: 202 ff.).  
The SPÖ’s income policies shifted from emphasising redistribution (SPÖ 1979) to 
promoting welfare policies that guarantee a minimum standard of living (SPÖ 1983: 32). In 
order to finance tax exemptions for low-income workers they proposed limiting the tax 
privileges of those on high-incomes and increasing the earnings limits in social insurance 
schemes. Moreover, since the beginning of the 1990s the SPÖ has supported union 
demands for the regulation of minimum wages through collective wage agreements. 
Furthermore, since the late 1990s policies towards welfare payments became more 
dependent on the willingness to accept paid employment, i.e. calling for an ‘activation’ of 
social transfer recipients (SPÖ 1999: 11). In the early 1990s the SPÖ began to advocate 
support for occupational and private schemes, while at the same time continuing to support 
the solidaristic public pension scheme (SPÖ 1990: 24; 1998: 18: 1999: 9f.; 2002: 12). 
Finally, the principle of subsidiarity gained importance in the delivery of social services for 
the Social Democrats during the 1980s. The 1979 election programme promoted the 
provision of social services by societal networks (SPÖ 1979), the 1983 programme aimed 
to promote self help by calling for cutbacks in state-run bureaucracy (SPÖ 1983: 14 f.) and 
the 1990 programme criticised state paternalism and called for more self-responsibility 
regarding social policy arrangements (SPÖ 1990: 24; 1998: 9).  
Overall the approach of the ÖVP to social policy can be characterised by a structural 
continuity during our period of analysis. Nevertheless, in addition to promoting the overall 
stability of the social policy structure, the Christian Democrats called for measures of cost 
containment, including cutbacks in unemployment insurance and the pension scheme 
especially in the mid 1990s. These cutbacks were justified with the necessity to reduce the 
increasing fiscal burden on the state and the private sector on the one hand and the need to 
accommodate the pension scheme to the conditions of demographic change on the other 
(ÖVP 1994: 52 f.; 1995a: 17). At the same time the ÖVP more strongly emphasised the 
promotion of private and occupational schemes in order to guarantee living standards (ÖVP 
1990: 25; 1994: 54; 1995a: 18; 1999: 9 f.; 2002: 12).  
In regards to the welfare-work nexus the Christian Democrats since the late 1990s promote 
workfare policies that oblige employable social assistance recipients to participate in 
community work programmes (ÖVP 1999: 71 ff.), having already increased the focus of the 
social transfer programmes more strongly on need and the willingness to work in the 
previous years. These measures, coupled with the promotion of non-profit organisations, 
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are intended to contain costs and strengthen the legitimacy of the social security system 
(e.g. ÖVP 1990: 23; 1994: 54 f.; 1995a: 17; 1999: 69; 2002: 81).  
3.1.3 Family Policies 
Throughout our period of analysis, both parties perceive the family as a core institution of 
society to be protected by public policy. However, differences in family policies between 
the two parties can be found in the aims, priorities and instruments (Rosenberger 1999: 
761). The ÖVP emphasises the indispensable function the family plays in social integration, 
whereas the SPÖ perceives the main function of the family as  providing a “good life for 
children”.7 The ÖVP’s policies were based on the ideological assumption that the family’s 
societal function cannot be replaced by the state (ÖVP 1978: 1), preferring family benefit 
payments and tax credits to direct provision of public services. The ÖVP’s family policies 
centre on compensating the burden of child rearing, aiming in principle at horizontal 
redistribution between families and childless households.  
By contrast, the SPÖ initially prioritised the expansion of services over the extension of 
transfer benefits in the 1970s (SPÖ 1978: 168; 1979: 13), but later converged to the 
Christian-Democratic family policy agenda. The party proposed a combination of expanded 
services and differentiated transfers in 1986, but nevertheless they still rejected the fiscal 
compensation of family burdens, since this did not address the issue of redistribution 
between the various income groups (SPÖ 1986: 6). Finally, in 1998 the SPÖ proposed a 
combination of tax credits, transfers, and social services. Although the Social Democratic 
proposals more strongly emphasise the financial compensation of child rearing, they still 
prioritise vertical redistribution (SPÖ 1998: 18). 
Both parties promote the “free choice” of parents regarding the arrangement of family life 
and gainful employment. Already in the 1970s the ÖVP promoted the “free choice” of 
mothers to be gainfully employed, or fully commit themselves to the upbringing of 
children. On one hand the instruments of family policies aimed to promote the freedom of 
the mother not to be engaged in wage labour by guaranteeing a family income through 
various tax measures and benefits.  Furthermore they promoted the recognition of time 
spent for child rearing within the pension scheme. On the other hand the Christian-
Democratic policy proposals also included an extension of social services and part-time-
employment in order to guarantee the free choice of mothers to be gainfully employed 
(ÖVP 1972: 209f.; 1975: 15; 1978: 7 ff.). The SPÖ traditionally promoted a policy 
approach of “family in partnership” (e.g. SPÖ 1983: 26) with both parents being equally 
able to reconcile work and family. Instrumentally the SPÖ focuses on the provision of 
public services and the extension of part-time-employment (SPÖ 1990: 26; 1994: 17; 1995: 
10; 1998: 16; 1999: 8 f.; 2002: 14). Thus, contrary to the ÖVP the programmatic approach 
                                                   
7  ÖVP 1972: 209 f.; 1975: 14; 1983: 10 f.; 1990: 24; 1994: 9; 1999: 29 ff.; 2002: 74 ff.; SPÖ 1978: 167 
f.; 1979: 12 f.; 1983: 26; 1986: 11; 1990: 20; 1994: 17 f.; 1998: 17 f.; 2002: 14. 
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was to a lesser extent based on the male-breadwinner model. Since the mid 1980s the SPÖ 
additionally promoted instruments that enhance the possibility of parents not participating 
in wage labour for a limited time, i.e. paid parental leave for both parents (SPÖ 1986: 12) 
and the recognition of child rearing in social insurance schemes (SPÖ 1990: 27).  
Thus, the Social Democratic agenda with regard to family policies became much more 
comprehensive by adopting various instruments traditionally promoted by the ÖVP. Since 
the early 1990s, however, the party positions in regards to childcare have clearly differed. 
While the SPÖ prefers the public provision of childcare, the ÖVP promotes private 
initiatives or nannies in addition to public provisions, based on the principle of subsidiarity 
and in order to promote parental choice (SPÖ 1994: 17; 1998: 16; 1999: 8 f.; 2002: 14; 
ÖVP 1990: 24; 1995a: 89 f.; 1999: 32; 2002: 75).  
3.1.4 Comparing Party Positions over Time 
The economic and social policy approaches of the ÖVP and the SPÖ largely corresponded 
to the Christian-Democratic and Social Democratic ideal types until the late 1970s. Yet the 
programmatic differences between ÖVP and SPÖ decrease over time. While the ÖVP 
initially even supported some Keynesian elements to economic policy, over the years it has 
promoted a more liberal approach. Regarding basic political aims the SPÖ reduced the 
formerly comprehensive responsibilities of the state to the regulation of the market and 
shifted from an outcome-oriented to a more process-oriented idea of social justice. Looking 
at social policies we witness a profound convergence of the SPÖ to the Christian-
Democratic agenda. In the early 2000s, both parties promote additional personal and 
occupational pension schemes. Moreover, both parties call for a widening of means-testing 
as well as an activation strategy. Finally, the Social Democrats have adapted the ÖVP’s 
comprehensive stance concerning family policies. 
3.2 The Dutch Case 
The central political aims of the Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA) have traditionally been 
the promotion of economic stability as well as social integration and cohesion (CDA 1977: 
31; 1980: 27; 1989: 6; 1993: 13; 1994: 9; 2002: 3), striving for the social regulation of 
capitalism, without promoting the redistribution of income and wealth (CDA 1986: 4). 
While the CDA initially focused on social security and the fight against poverty, its focus 
has shifted towards more process-oriented intervention (for example, the adoption of equal 
opportunity in the economy as a core aim) (CDA 1998: 53). Traditionally, the philosophy 
of the Dutch Christian parties was strongly rooted in the responsibility of community 
organisations, and the CDA, as well as its catholic and protestant predecessors, criticised 
the loss of the individuals’ commitment for the community (CDA 1977: 4; 1980: 8; 1986: 
28). The core responsibility of the state was to provide the preconditions for citizens to 
organise their private life in a self-responsible way (CDA 1977: 2; 1982: 76; 1993: 14; 
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1994: 19). In emphasising social cohesion and community arrangements, the CDA 
promotes an environment for individuals, communities and the state, which clearly differs 
from the positions of truly liberal parties (CDA 1986: 28; 2002: 4; Lucardie 1993: 50).  
In contrast Social Democrats, have traditionally promoted the redistribution of income and 
wealth as core instruments to achieve economic and social justice (PvdA 1977a: 24; 1981: 
8). Yet, in their election programme of 1982, they conceded that an extensive equalisation 
of income and wealth was neither possible, nor desirable (PvdA 1982: 3). Comprehensive 
programmatic change, however, occurred in 1987: A guaranteed social minimum and the 
promotion of successful participation in the market economy became the basic aims of 
public policy (PvdA 1987: 123f.; 1994: 10), and the former priority of income redistribution 
was replaced by the redistribution of work (PvdA 1987: 10). Since the beginning of the 
1990s, the priority of redistributing work faded in favour of increasing labour market 
participation among the working-age population (PvdA 2002: 25). Until the mid-1980s, the 
Social Democrats criticised the Christian-Democratic concepts of community and social 
cohesion, as a backward step to personal dependency (PvdA 1987: 125). Soon after, 
however, social cohesion became the central focus of their policies. While the promotion of 
community, self-responsibility, and individual initiative were discussed as rooted in Social 
Democratic traditions, they were indeed increasingly based on a communitarian analysis 
(PvdA 1989: 21; 1994: 10; 2002: 74). 
3.2.1 Economic and Employment Policies  
A strictly monetarist economic policy and limits to public sector growth formed the central 
platform of the Christian alliance8 for the 1977 elections (CDA 1977: 17, 30). Wage 
increases below productivity gains were considered to be a crucial element in the fight to 
reduce unemployment and limit public spending (CDA 1977: 17). Furthermore the CDA 
called for an active labour market policy, focusing on training and further education (CDA 
1977: 17), marking an important deviation from the Christian Democratic ideal type.9  
However, starting in the 1980s the CDA stopped calling for active macro-economic 
intervention by the state to manage the economy, promoting reduction in state expenditure 
(CDA 1986: 30; 1994: 36; 2002: 8). Furthermore, in the election programme of 1982, the 
Christian Democrats announced for the first time the need to deregulate the labour market. 
Moreover, they called for income tax reductions and limited privatisations (CDA 1982: 8, 
24, 39). In addition to low wage costs and low capital income taxation, innovation and 
education completed the shift to supply side policies (CDA 1986: 29f; 1994: 33; 1995: 9; 
1998: 8, 55). 
                                                   
8  The Christian parties had not officially merged to the CDA until 1980. 
9  Between 1977 and 1981 there were deep conflicts between the more Keynesian-oriented part of the 
party, represented by the Minister for Social Affairs Albeda, and the more liberal faction around the 
Finance Minister Andriessen (Braun 1989: 267f.).  
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While fiscal restraints were not an issue in pursuing various aims in the 1971 election 
programme (PvdA 1971: 15f.), the PvdA accepted the necessity to restrict public 
expenditure growth in 1977 (PvdA 1977b: 92). In order to stabilise the public deficit Social 
Democrats promoted higher income and inheritance taxation (PvdA 1977b: 20). 
Furthermore, the Social Democrats continued to promote an anti-capitalist economic 
approach (PvdA 1977a: 9ff.), advocating the nationalisation of core industries (PvdA 
1977a: 25), the redistribution of work, the creation of public employment, selective 
investment programmes, and wage moderation to reduce unemployment (PvdA 1977b: 10; 
23; 26). Finally, despite first policy shifts, the Social Democrats continued to call for state-
led macroeconomic management of the economy until the mid-1980s (PvdA 1981: 4; 1982: 
3). 
The 1986 election programme, shows crucial modifications: Instead of increasing taxation 
in order to finance public expenditures, the Social Democrats announced income tax 
reductions to compensate for decreasing wages (PvdA 1986: 28). Moreover, for the first 
time they called for the reduction of the public debt (PvdA 1986: 15), thereby actively 
limiting public financial resources. Employment policy was largely limited to working time 
reductions and the promotion of part-time work within the public sector (PvdA 1986: 24). 
By 1987 the once central aim of nationalisation was explicitly dropped and replaced with 
the aim to stop further privatisation (PvdA 1987: 70). Furthermore, the Social Democrats 
started to emphasise supply-side instruments in order to improve the employment situation, 
i.e. promoting investment in research and training, shifting attention towards active labour 
market policy, which contrary to the Social Democratic ideal type has traditionally not 
played an important role for the PvdA (1987: 69, 111). Despite the increased emphasis on 
supply-side instruments the Social Democrats continued to call for demand-oriented 
economic policies until the late eighties (PvdA 1987: 86). Since then they have completed 
the supply-side shift by stressing the need to adapt the wage and tax rates and other supply-
side measures to improve the international competitiveness of Dutch companies (PvdA 
1989: 1, 6, 9; 1994: 1ff.; 1998: 28; 2002: 78). 
To summarise, the economic and employment policies of the PvdA changed dramatically 
within the last 25 years. The programmatic change among the Social Democrats constituted 
the precondition for the far-reaching economic consensus of the two welfare state parties. 
Slight differences remain in so far that the Social Democrats continue to discuss social 
problems and the risks of privatisation more extensively than Christian Democrats (PvdA 
1994: 19; 2002: 74).  
3.2.2 Social Policies 
The CDA has always stressed the importance of self-responsibility and community, but in 
1980, the Christian Democrats explicitly criticised the passive character of the welfare state 
for the first time and demanded more personal responsibility in the welfare system (CDA 
1980: 29). Despite this criticism, the crisis of the welfare state was not perceived to result 
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from passive welfare state structures, but rather from the insufficient competitiveness of the 
Dutch economy. Therefore the promotion of employment by means of supply-side 
measures was held to be the true social policy approach (CDA 1982: 26; cf. Kersbergen 
1997: 326). Conceptually, the CDA has gradually integrated “social security” and “labour 
market” policies (CDA 1994: 43ff.). In addition to stricter “suitability” criteria, the CDA 
promoted a relaxation of the income disregards when determining unemployment and 
disability benefits in order to increase work incentives (CDA 1989: 27; 1993: 43ff.; 1998: 
53). Although increased efforts in regards to training and education became central 
elements of labour market policies since the early eighties, cutting benefits and tightening 
the suitability criteria were the main proposed policy instruments to activate social 
assistance recipients (CDA 1994: 44).  
Fundamentally the CDA supports the existing mix of “people’s insurances” (old age and 
survivors’ insurances), worker’s insurances (against unemployment, long-term disability 
and sickness) and a universal tax-financed safety net of social assistance (CDA 1982: 7). 
Furthermore, the party continued to promote property ownership among the working class 
(CDA 1977: 19; 1986: 40; 1993: 45; 1998: 28). Since the 1990s the party has pushed the 
so-called Cappuccino model, i.e. the promotion of private supplements in addition to the 
traditional combination of universal and earning-related insurances (CDA 1998: 55). 
Furthermore, marketisation and private incentives were supported in the realm of social 
services, which led to a prioritisation of demand subsidisation over publicly provided 
services, fundamentally altering the nature of social care provision (CDA 1998: 15; 2002: 
46). 
Over time, the Social Democrats’ main focus on social justice shifted from redistribution of 
income and wealth to the promotion of equal opportunity. Nevertheless the party adhered to 
the basic structure of the welfare state and in contrast to the CDA, the Social Democrats 
initially, vehemently rejected any cuts in social transfers. Moreover, they promised to 
reintroduce the linkage between social transfer benefit and wage increases (PvdA 1977b: 
15, 93; 1981: 9). By 1986 the Social Democrats argued that labour market integration 
should have priority over receiving transfer benefits (PvdA 1986: 14, 32; 1987: 115), while 
at the same time emphasising that a social security system of high quality is the basis of 
people’s willingness to accept the consequences of rising labour market flexibility and self-
responsibility (PvdA 1987: 114). However, the Social Democrats finally accepted a 
reduction of welfare payments as one component of their activation strategy built on carrots 
and sticks in the 1990s (PvdA 1994: 10, 54; 1998: 32), which also included the partial 
privatisation of risk coverage (PvdA 1994: 21). Disability and unemployment insurance 
joined the provision of sickness benefits as the social policy instruments which changed 
most in the Social Democratic programme.  
Despite the outlined shift, however, the Social Democrats are still more hesitant to promote 
a reduction of social transfer benefits than the Christian Democrats (PvdA 1998: 34f.). 
Finally in their most recent election program, the Social Democratic proposals in regards to 
social services parallel the concepts of the Christian Democrats, i.e. considering the 
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subsidisation of demand to be more efficient than to publicly provide the supply (PvdA 
2002: 73).  
3.2.3 Family Policies 
The CDA has continuously emphasised the special importance of marriage and family for 
society (CDA 1977: 1; 1980: 6; 1989: 72; 1993: 75; 1998: 11). Yet over time they revised 
their traditional understanding of societal relationships and began to support the notion of 
equality between marriage and “long-term relationships” (CDA 1982: 43). At the same time 
the Christian Democrats substantially revised their position concerning the exclusive 
responsibility of parents for their children’s upbringing and education. Whereas the 1980 
party programme still explicitly stressed that “the child [...] should grow up under the 
constant provision and responsibility of the parents” (CDA 1980: 6; authors’ translation), 
the party called for an extension of public childcare under certain circumstances (CDA 
1982: 43). Finally, in the early 1990s, as the Christian Democrats began to call for 
increased labour market participation of both parents, proposing a general expansion of 
child-care provision to increase the compatibility of work and family responsibilities. In 
addition, the CDA called for improvement in the condition of part-time work and parental 
and maternal leave (CDA 1993: 47; 75f.; 1998: 11; 2002: 6). Where in 1977, the CDA had 
promoted social policies based on the male breadwinner philosophy (CDA 1977: 19), they 
started to call for women’s economic independence as an indispensable precondition for 
emancipation (CDA 1994: 43). Finally, since the end of the 1990s family policies take 
precedence over traditional social and economic policy aims, culminating in the demand to 
establish a Ministry for Family Affairs (CDA 1998: 6; 11; 2002: 11). 
In contrast to the CDA, the PvdA never has explicitly acknowledged the specific 
importance of marriage and family for society. Issues like child benefits, child care or 
parental leave were instead discussed as instruments for the promotion of women’s 
emancipation and independence (PvdA 1986: 14, 31; 1989: 8, 17; 1998: 30; 2002: 22). In 
addition, the Social Democrats promoted the individualisation of social rights and called for 
a social policy focusing on individual family members instead of the family as an institution 
(PvdA 1981: 9; 1989: 21; 1994: 55).   
Making it easier for parents to reconcile work and family responsibilities has constituted a 
core issue of Social Democratic family policies, since the 1980s (PvdA 1982: 2; 1989: 9; 
1994: 52; 1998: 11; 28; 2002: 22). Whereas the CDA always promoted a universal child 
benefit, thereby favouring horizontal redistribution between those households with children 
and those without (CDA 1977: 18), the PvdA supported a means-tested child benefit until 
the mid-1980s (PvdA 1977b: 18; 1981: 9), thus prioritising vertical redistribution in favour 
of families with low incomes. By 1982, the promotion of public childcare for all children 
had become a central issue. Four years later the PvdA proposed an entitlement to part-time 
work for parents, promised to extend the maternal leave and to introduce a paid parental 
leave of six months (PvdA 1986: 35). Although the PvdA continued to concentrate its 
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family policies on gender equality and labour market integration, they have begun to value 
unpaid familial care more strongly since 1998 (PvdA 1998: 26). 
Overall, we can speak of a far-reaching consensus in regard to family policies (cf. NGR 
2002). This consensus is due to the profound change of the Christian-Democratic family 
model, the Social Democrats’ promotion of the family’s societal role, and a changed 
perspective among Social Democrats in regard to redistribution. Improving the possibilities 
to reconcile work and family responsibilities have become core issues for both parties. 
3.2.4 Comparing party positions over time 
Although some authors have diagnosed a convergence of the Dutch Christian and Social 
Democrats since the 1950s (van Kersbergen 1997: 318; Snels 1999: 51), our analysis of the 
election programmes shows profound differences in the mid-70s, where apart from the 
economic and employment policy positions both parties more or less fitted our ideal types. 
Since the end of the 1970s, however, we witness a continuous convergence. Concerning the 
overall role of the state as well as the economic and social policies the party positions of the 
PvdA have changed comprehensively, by and large leading to an adaptation of the Christian 
Democratic ideal type. Obvious examples for this development are: refraining from calling 
for a substantial redistribution of income and Keynesian economic management, while at 
the same time calling for the promotion of community and self-responsibility beyond the 
state as well as the benefits of supply-side policies.10 The core aims, the concept of the state 
as well as crucial economic policies of the Christian Democrats have largely stayed 
constant, though there are rising liberal tendencies (Lucardie 1993: 40; ten Napel 1997: 63). 
The development of the Christian Democratic social policy approach parallels the Social 
Democrat’s adjustments towards activation. The key differences have largely melted away 
since the late 1980s. Finally, in the realm of family policies the CDA dropped the 
traditional notion of the male breadwinner model and slowly accepted the modern concept 
of a two-earner family, whereas the PvdA accepted the overall importance of the family for 
the social cohesion of the community. 
3.3 The German Case 
German Social Democracy had already transformed its more radical programmatic 
approach in the 1950s by accepting the market principle (cf. Padgett 1993). Still, the aim of 
Social Democracy was to accomplish full-employment and redistribute income and wealth. 
The accomplishment of these two aims was largely the responsibility of the state, achieved 
through economic planning and a democratisation of the capitalist economy (SPD 1975). 
                                                   
10  It is remarkable that the CDA stressed a far reaching consensus with the PvdA concerning social and 
economic issues in 1994 (CDA 1994: 19). 
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Starting in the mid-1970s the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) charged that the 
governing Social-Liberal coalition had overextended the (welfare) state and that this 
development had to be stopped. The main reason behind these allegations was not that the 
Christian Democrats no longer believed in the welfare state, but in their view government 
intervention was crippling business investments (as well as international competitiveness) 
and thereby undermining the welfare state. The Christian Democrats therefore deemed it 
both logical and necessary to call for certain social benefits to be cut. Furthermore, the 
Christian Democrats argued that the social policy design of the past had neglected and 
discriminated against the family. Hence, the CDU called for family policy to be expanded, 
while simultaneously proposing an overall reduction of government intervention. In their 
view, their policy proposals were based on reinvigorating the philosophy of the Social 
Market Economy, i.e. the German variant of social capitalism (CDU 1976 ff.).  
As we will show, these ‘Christian-Democratic’ patterns have emerged as dominating the 
political discourse over the years. Within this normative framework the following 
arguments resurfaced over and over again: 1) the need to strengthen market mechanisms 
and promote self-responsibility within the Social Market Economy; 2) the need to 
concentrate benefits more strongly on the ‘truly needy’; and 3) the need to clamp down on 
‘fraud’ and ‘abuse’. 
3.3.1 Economic and Employment Policies 
Although the Social Democrats recognised very early that the internationalisation of the 
economy would limit a national strategy of macro-economic management, they continued 
to propose a full-employment policy based on active labour market policy and economic 
planning (SPD 1975). In contrast, the Christian Democrats called for a reduction of state 
intervention and a policy of price stability. In order to reduce unemployment they called for 
“stability-oriented wage agreements” between the social partners. One of their main foci 
was to secure the international competitiveness of German companies (CDU 1976: 20 f.). 
By 1980 they forcefully called for a reduction of the state debt, which in their view had 
dramatically increased during the reign of the Social-liberal coalition government. To a 
large extent the increase of unemployment was the result of an investment-unfriendly 
climate of public policy. Once again the Christian Democrats reiterated that the social 
partners had a special obligation for realising full employment (CDU/CSU 1980: 53). A 
prime aim of Christian-Democratic public policy would be a reduction in taxation and 
social insurance contributions. This approach would lead to economic growth necessary to 
finance social policy (CDU/CSU 1983).  
During the process of German unification from 1989 to 1992, the Christian Democrats’ 
primary concern was to successfully master the unification process even if this meant 
higher public deficits (CDU 1990: 4). After the budget deficit had ballooned in the early 
1990s, they once again returned to their previous policy stance of limiting government 
expenditures and the need to reduce social insurance contributions in the light of a 
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perceived decreasing international competitiveness. Price stability, limiting government 
expenditures, a reduction of social insurance contributions, and the need to liberalise labour 
law became the hallmarks of the Christian-Democratic economic proposals in order to 
achieve economic growth and reduce unemployment (CDU 1994a, 1994b, 1998, 2002).  
After being banned into the opposition in 1982, the German Social Democrats continued - 
even more forcefully than as when they were still in office - to call for a deficit-financed 
employment policy (SPD 1983: 99). They rejected the argument that in order for Germany 
to stay competitive internationally, social insurance contributions had to be reduced. To a 
large extent their party positions on economic and employment policies followed the 
traditional Social Democratic line (SPD 1983, 1986; cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 118-120). 
However, their programmatic approach began to change during the second half of the 
1990s. Eventually they accepted the interpretation whereby deficit-financed employment 
programmes would not be feasible and social insurance contributions had to be reduced in 
order to stay competitive in the global economy (SPD 1994, 1998). Furthermore, the Social 
Democrats began to stress more strongly the benefits of the market, than they had 
previously (cf. SPD 1998; 2002). The Blair-Schroeder Paper (1999)11 symbolises the more 
‘radical’ programmatic version of this new thinking among top German, Social Democratic 
politicians. According to this document Social Democratic policy should be guided by the 
following credo: 
...[W]e need to apply our politics within a new economic framework, modernised 
for today, where government does all it can to support enterprise but never 
believes it is a substitute for enterprise. The essential function of markets must 
be complemented and improved by political action, not hampered by it. We 
support a market economy, not a market society.  
Comparing the programmatic aims in regards to economic and employment policies over 
time and between the two welfare state parties, we largely find continuity among Christian 
Democrats in regards to budget and employment policies. However, it must be recognised 
that they increasingly called for a liberalisation of labour law, especially the dismissal 
regulations. Although intellectually the Social Democrats had recognised the limits of 
Keynesian policies in the mid-1970s, they more or less continued to follow the traditional 
Social Democratic policy path in terms of economic and employment policies until the 
mid-1990s. Since then we can identify a clear process of convergence towards the policy 
positions of the Christian Democrats.  
3.3.2 Social Policies 
In the mid-1970s, the Social Democrats justified their previous social policy expansions as 
the correct policy approach, since only well protected workers would support the necessary 
                                                   
11  Although this paper never received the status of an official party document, it heavily influenced the 
debate within the SPD (cf. Gohr 2003: 46-49).  
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structural changes of the economy (SPD 1976: 21). After having expanded a large number 
of social policy programmes in the early 1970s, the Social Democrats emphasised the need 
to accomplish greater equality of opportunity between the sexes as the most pressing social 
policy issue for the immediate future (ibid.: 22-24).  
The Christian Democrats stressed their rejection of redistributive social policies and 
emphasised the personal achievement component of the social insurance system 
(CDU/CSU 1983: 73). Furthermore, they accused the SPD of having ruined state finances 
and undermined the foundations of social policy. They emphasised that social benefits 
should be more strongly focused on the ‘truly needy’. Furthermore, the CDU/CSU declared 
that certain restrictions in social policy would be necessary to secure jobs and preserve the 
financial foundations of the social safety net (CDU/CSU 1980, 1983). Nevertheless, this 
policy stance should not be mistaken with an outright ideological attack on the welfare 
state. In addition to taking back ‘overextended’ welfare state provisions, the Christian 
Democrats were calling for expansions in the realm of family-oriented social policies 
(Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).  
As the 1980s drew to a close, both parties acknowledged that the old-age insurance needed 
to be reformed in order to adapt to the projected demographic changes. Yet, neither the 
CDU nor the SPD called for the public pay-as-you-go financing system to be abandoned or 
transformed into a partially funded private system. In addition to social security 
contributions levied on dependent employment, the SPD called for the introduction of a 
‘machine tax’ for capital-intensive companies. The ‘machine tax’ was intended to slow 
down the increase of productivity-induced unemployment and to increase the revenues of 
the old-age insurance system (SPD 1986; 1988). Furthermore, the Social Democrats called 
for the introduction of (means-tested) minimum benefits within the unemployment and old-
age insurance systems (SPD 1988: 21).  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the most pressing issue in regards to social policy was the 
transfer of the west-German social policy system to the East (CDU 1990). Starting in 1994, 
the CDU began to identify the necessity to redesign social policy, due to increased 
globalisation. Specifically, they called for an expansion of workfare programmes for the 
unemployed social assistance recipients and heralded the achieved cost reductions within 
the domain of unemployment compensation as the result of an intensified crackdown on 
fraud as well as reductions of the wage replacement ratio. In regards to old age, they 
continued to support the contribution-based social insurance approach and rejected 
proposals to introduce a minimum pension. Moreover, people should be encouraged to 
participate in complementary ‘private’ schemes, including schemes negotiated by the social 
partners (CDU 1994: 39 f.). Re-emphasising the necessity for more personal responsibility 
became a core principle of the Christian-Democratic social policy approach in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. This included proposing an expansion of workfare programmes for 
unemployment compensation recipients and promoting ‘private’ as well as company-based 
old-age insurance arrangements (CDU/CSU 1998, CDU 2002). 
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Although the Social Democrats initially propagated taking back some of the cuts in various 
social policy programmes in their 1998 election manifesto, they did not develop a reformed 
Social Democratic social policy approach. Similar to the Christian Democrats they called 
for increased self-responsibility, a reduction of government tutelage, and emphasised 
activation (SPD 1998, 2002; cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2004a: 127-129).12 In the Schroeder-Blair 
(1999) Paper it was argued that “[t]oo often rights were elevated above responsibilities, but 
the responsibility of the individual to his or her family, neighbourhood and society cannot 
be offloaded on to the state. ... Modern Social Democrats want to transform the safety net of 
entitlements into a springboard to personal responsibility.” Adopting this approach towards 
social policy meant that the Social Democrats had largely moved towards the social policy 
positions articulated by Christian Democrats since the mid-1970s – namely, the need to 
reduce government intervention and promote more personal responsibility. 
3.3.3 Family Policies 
The debate on family policy differed greatly from the patterns dominating the discourse on 
wage earner-centred social policies. In the 1970s the Christian Democrats successfully 
constructed a new interpretative pattern, whereby the mother (parents) should have the right 
to choose whether to work or not to work and fully commit herself to child rearing. Family 
work and employment in the labour market are in essence equivalent according to the CDU 
(1976: 13 f.). This programmatic stance clearly deviated from the traditional role Christian 
Democrats had ascribed to mothers and at the same time repudiated the Social Democrats’ 
view that certain ‘family’ benefits should be primarily focused on the ‘working’ mother (cf. 
Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).  
Overall the Christian Democrats began to emphasise family policy more strongly and called 
for family policies to be expanded. Due to structural discrimination, so their argument ran, 
the institution of the family was in immediate need of more support. In this context the 
proposal to introduce child-rearing credits in the old-age insurance programme is of great 
significance (CDU 1978: 149 f.). Moving to place a limited time of family work and wage 
work on an ‘equal’ footing within the old-age insurance system established a new argument 
of social justice. The CDU/CSU (1983: 73) continued to state that “[P]ensions are no alms. 
They are a return on the lifetime achievement of pensioners. Therefore, the pension must 
continue to be based on achievement and contributions.” In other words, the principle of 
achievement was now also applied to work within the family. This rationale was rooted in 
the broader debate on promoting freedom of choice - in other words, enabling parents to 
decide for themselves which parent would go out to work and which parent would stay at 
home and care for the children (CDU/CSU 1983: 73). Further proposals included the 
introduction of a parental benefit, parental leave, and increases in existing transfer 
programmes (CDU 1980: 53 f.). SPD members did not believe that the CDU/CSU was 
                                                   
12  Furthermore, they emphasised more strongly than before the concept of equal opportunity as a crucial 
element in their social policy strategy. 
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indeed promoting freedom of choice. Moreover, they claimed the CDU approach simply 
reconfirmed the conservative view of the family (SPD 1983: 113).  
The salience of family-policy issues was much lower among Social Democrats. They 
emphasised the necessity for an expansion of childcare facilities (SPD 1976: 26). Beginning 
in the second half of the 1980s, the Social Democrats slowly began to accept the 
interpretative patterns of the CDU in regards to family policy. They now supported the 
newly introduced parental leave and the parental benefit as well as the child-rearing credits 
within the pension system. During their long-years in the opposition they did not propose a 
fundamentally different family-policy approach. They largely limited their criticism to the 
fact that the expansion of family policies should be more comprehensive and achieved 
faster (SPD 1988: 19 f.). Although an expansion of public childcare facilities had long been 
part of their programmatic stance, it reached centre-stage only during the early 2000s (SPD 
2002: 46 f.).  By this time the Christian Democrats had also understood the “necessity” to 
expand childcare facilities in order to reconcile work and family life better. However, they 
proposed a mix of public, company, and private childcare provisions (CDU 2002: 29 f.).  
3.3.4 Comparing Party Positions over Time 
We witnessed an overall convergence of policy positions among the two welfare state 
parties in the three policy areas analysed. Compared to the ideal positions outlined in the 
theory chapter, we can observe an overall convergence towards the ideal Christian-
Democratic welfare state. This includes a withdrawal by the Social Democrats from 
previous positions in regards to the public responsibility for full employment through 
macro-economic management, promotion of more private and company provisions in 
welfare, and a greater emphasis on the need to support the family. With regard to the 
provision of childcare and improved possibilities to reconcile work and family obligations 
the Christian Democrats converged towards positions previously emphasised by Social 
Democrats. Finally, in terms of collective labour law the Christian Democrats increasingly 
promote liberal positions.  
4 Comparing Policy Positions: Difference, Convergence, or  
Diffusion? 
The core question in the three presented case studies has been whether Christian Democrats 
and Social Democrats still differ in their party positions in regards to welfare state policies 
as they did during the ‘golden’ post-WWII era. We will now discuss the developments in an 
international comparative perspective. In principle three trajectories of party development 
can be imagined as: a) continued difference, b) convergence, and c) diffusion. The 
comparative analysis will be developed along the dimensions presented in Tab. 1. In the 
first section we will therefore ask whether the overall aims and the role of the state have 
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changed. After this initial analysis we discuss the three policy areas of economic and 
employment policies, social policies, and family policies.  
At the beginning of our period of analysis, the Social Democrats in our three countries 
promoted the overall goal of achieving greater economic justice and full employment 
through state intervention. In general our three Christian-Democratic parties were more 
strongly focused towards social stability, promoting community, and limited state 
intervention. However, in terms of achieving the goal of full employment the ÖVP as well 
as the CDA initially deviated from the ideal. While the German CDU by and large did not 
support Keynesian employment policies, the two other Christian-Democratic parties 
initially embraced such an approach. Furthermore, the CDU began very early to call for 
limits to state intervention, whereas the CDA and ÖVP followed suit in the early 1980s and 
1990s respectively.  
Compared to the development of the three Christian-Democratic parties in our analysis, the 
Social Democrats underwent a comprehensive redefinition of their goals. While initially 
full employment and a “just” distribution of income and wealth had been their primary 
goals in addition to economic efficiency, achieving higher employment ratios and 
promoting more community and self-responsibility became core Social Democratic aims. 
The change seemed to be more “radical” among the Dutch and Austrian Social Democratic 
parties, which is due to very different starting points: Comparatively speaking the PvdA had 
a very radical, anti-capitalist approach in the 1970s and the Austrian Social Democrats were 
protecting a huge nationalised manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, the PvdA started to 
comprehensively redefine the state’s role in the economy during the second half of the 
1980s, rejecting socialisation and characterising a policy of domestic demand management 
as ineffective in an open economy. Parallel the concepts of community and self-
responsibility became central for the redefined role of the state.  
The development within the SPÖ was somewhat more incremental and took longer. 
However, we have to bear in mind that the call for privatisation within the SPÖ in the mid-
1980s originated at a time when the state still owned a comparatively large part of the 
manufacturing sector. While the PvdA and SPÖ had already refrained from calling for 
deficit-financed employment programmes during the 1980s, a Keynesian economic 
approach was explicitly rejected by the German Social Democrats only in the late 1990s. In 
all three parties the focus of economic and employment policies shifted towards an 
emphasis of supply-side measures. In tandem with this withdrawal of public responsibility 
for full employment, the Social Democrats partially withdrew from promoting a higher 
degree of equality through the redistribution of wealth. Again the process was more 
protracted among the German Social Democrats than among the other two parties. But only 
the PvdA went so far as to explicitly drop the issue of wealth redistribution from its party 
programme. All three parties have geared their economic policies towards promoting price 
stability. To summarise: we witness a process of convergence of the Social Democratic 
parties towards the Christian Democratic approach in the dimension of economic and 
employment policies. Although the three Christian-Democratic parties have shown clear 
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tendencies towards more liberal policy positions, they have not become (neo-) liberal 
parties.  
Similar to the development in economic and employment policies the CDA shows the most 
remarkable development of the three Christian Democratic parties in regards to social 
policies. In addition to calling for cuts in various social policy programmes, the CDA 
started in the early 1980s to question the structure of the welfare state. A similar process did 
not start in Austria before the early 1990s and even later within the CDU. However, we 
have to bear in mind that the German Christian Democrats have always rejected universal 
benefits and emphasised achievement-oriented social policies. Since the late 1990s, all 
three parties have called for promoting more private social policy arrangements and 
strengthening the means-testing criteria for public social transfer programmes. Within the 
three Social Democratic parties, we witness a similar trend. Once again the timing in the 
three countries differed substantially. Regarding the overall “recalibration” (Pierson, 2001) 
of social policies and the promotion of “activation” the speed and scale of the reforms 
differed remarkably. As early as the late 1980s, activation became a cornerstone of social 
policy for the PvdA, while the other two Social Democratic parties adopted a similar 
approach much later. Also in terms of promoting ‘private’ social policy arrangements, the 
PvdA took the lead within our group of Social Democratic parties. Again at the end of our 
period of analysis, the three parties seem to have reached similar positions that, however, 
do not substantially deviate from the positions of the Christian Democrats. 
The realm of family policy has become much more important in the programmatic welfare 
state design in all of our six parties. Whereas the Social Democrats programmatically had a 
stronger track record on demanding more public child-care facilities, initially they did not 
emphasise the family as a core institution of society as strongly as the Christian Democrats. 
During our period of analysis the Christian Democrats substantially ‘modernised’ their 
conception of family. Over the entire period the ÖVP promoted the concept of “freedom of 
choice”, meaning that, it was up to the family to decide, which of the parents takes care of 
the children. Yet, at the level of instruments the ÖVP for a long time promoted policies that 
were biased towards the non-working mother. In Germany, the CDU took up the concept of 
“freedom of choice” in the late 1970s and expanded it in the 1980s. Conceptually, a limited 
time spent on care work was to be recognised as principally equivalent to employment in 
regards to pension entitlements. In contrast to the two other Christian-Democratic parties, 
the CDA explicitly continued to expect one parent to care for the children until the late 
1980s, while, however, they did not categorically define this as the role of the mother. 
Since the early 1990s, the Dutch Christian Democrats now support an approach, whereby 
both parents should be engaged in wage labour. With these changes in policy positions, all 
three Christian-Democratic parties have turned away from the traditional male-breadwinner 
model and all support an increase of external child-care provisions. In their view, however, 
these child-care places should not solely be provided by the state, but parents should have a 
choice of various arrangement options and provisions. The PvdA also supports this 
approach, whereas the SPÖ and the SPD still primarily favour the public provision of 
childcare. More importantly, however, the Social Democrats have shifted a greater amount 
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of attention towards family policies. In regards to family policy, we can perhaps speak of a 
more or less symmetric convergence, i.e. both party families surrendering some their prior 
policy positions. 
Building on the conceptualisation of change proposed by Hall (1993), our findings show 
that, by redefining their aims the Social Democrats in our three countries have undergone a 
“third order change”. The changes among the Christian Democrats were limited to “first 
and second order” changes since they primarily limited their adaptations to the level of 
instruments. In terms of direction, we have witnessed an overall convergence of the three 
Social Democratic parties towards the Christian Democratic ideal type. During our period 
of analysis, the PvdA, the SPÖ, and the SPD have withdrawn their goal of greater social 
equality through the promotion of a full employment strategy and ubiquitous public 
responsibility for achieving social justice. Moreover, they started to emphasise subsidiarity, 
community and self-responsibility, de-emphasised the issue of redistribution, while 
promoting equal opportunity as well as the need to concentrate social policy more strongly 
on the truly needy. Furthermore, they accepted limited deregulation and decentralisation as 
well as workfare and the partial ‘privatisation’ of social risk coverage. Thus we question the 
continued validity of the theory that parties still want to make a difference in regards to 
welfare state policies. Despite the overall convergence of Social and Christian Democrats 
we witness remaining differences, but these are confined to specific instruments as well as 
the extent of welfare cuts and privatisation measures.  
To summarise: Contrary to many journalistic accounts and based on our in-depth 
comparative analysis of the party manifestos, we cannot speak of a trend towards a (neo-) 
liberal approach within our welfare democracies. The party differences between Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats largely fade away due to a convergence of our three 
Social Democratic Parties towards the ideal Christian-Democratic welfare state in a number 
of policy dimensions (cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2002). Although the Christian Democrats have 
undergone moderate programmatic changes towards more ‘liberal’ positions they cannot 
accurately be characterised as ‘neo-liberal’ parties.13 Moreover, both party groups seem to 
propose a similar ‘new’ welfare state design, which can be coined a liberal-communitarian 
approach to social policy.14  
                                                   
13  For a characterisation of the Christian Democrats as more or less having transformed towards liberal 
positions see Hanley (2003: 243). 
14  Liberal in this context does not have the “American” meaning of  “state interventionist”, but of classical 
European liberalism.  First ideas of a liberal-communitarian welfare regime were discussed by Seeleib-
Kaiser (2004b) and Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser (2004). 
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5 Towards a liberal-communitarian welfare state? 
In terms of economic and employment policies this liberal-communitarian approach largely 
mirrors the “old” ideal of the Christian-Democratic welfare state. Hence, the state refrains 
from deficit-financed employment programmes, focuses its attention on improving supply-
side provisions, and pursues a non-inflationary monetary policy. Some observers might call 
this a “neo-liberal” approach. Yet it was increasingly acknowledged by both welfare state 
parties in our three countries that the state also ought to intervene in order to improve the 
employment capabilities of the unemployed social transfer recipients. This led to the 
proposal of activation measures, which constitute a bridge between a supply-side oriented 
employment strategy and compensatory social transfer policies. Focussing more strongly on 
supply-side policies does not necessarily have to be identical with “neo-liberalism” since it 
could also mean greater state intervention. 
Receiving social transfers by unemployed workers is still conceptualised as a right or 
entitlement, as long as the recipients live up to their responsibilities. While in the past these 
responsibilities in Christian-Democratic welfare states were largely defined by having paid 
prior contributions to social insurance schemes, they are becoming increasingly defined by 
personal activities aimed at improving reemployment opportunities. In other realms of 
social policy, the welfare state parties reduce their commitment for public social policy 
provisions and promote ‘private’ social arrangements. However, these ‘private’ 
arrangements do not necessarily mean that the state should fully withdraw, but that the role 
of the state should change from provider to regulator with the aim of giving social partners 
and market actors new opportunities to devise social policy arrangements. All these 
measures are designed to promote self-responsibility within societies that continue to value 
social cohesion. It is very hard to categorise these various proposals; they seem to reflect a 
mixture of liberal and communitarian values.  
Finally, the welfare state parties in our three countries all promote a more active public 
support for families. These proposals can definitely not be characterised as liberal. 
Moreover, they build on a ‘revised’ communitarian conceptualisation in regards to the 
important role of the family for society. According to the ideal Christian-Democratic 
welfare state of the past, the state should protect the standard family and largely refrain 
from active policies while supporting the family wage. Now both welfare state parties 
promote the right of equal access of both parents to the labour market and thereby withdraw 
from the notion of a male breadwinner. Hence, family policies should be designed in such a 
way that parents can reconcile work and family responsibilities. This approach includes a 
large number of measures, reaching from (paid) parental leave to the expansion of child-
care facilities. Not all of these measures can be characterised as potentially leading to a 
greater degree of “de-familialisation” (Esping-Andersen 1999), moreover, many proposals 
support the continuance of some care functions by the family. Hence, in terms of family 
policies the ‘new’ liberal-communitarian welfare state clearly differs from the ‘old’ 
Christian-Democratic ideal. 
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Overall this ‘new’ conceptualisation of the welfare state is to a large extent in accordance 
with proposals made by “communitarians”, such as Amitai Etzioni (1993; 2001).15 It seems 
to be especially important to highlight that his normative arguments in favour of an 
expansion of public family policies16 and the concept of rights and responsibilities in 
regards to social transfer payments largely parallel the arguments found in the party 
programmes we have analysed. The political aim is achieving social cohesion, based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. Some observers have identified “communitarianism” as one of the 
ideational streams influencing the “Third Way” discussions, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (see Levitas 1998; Hay/Watson 1999; Vorländer 2001). In our three continental-
European welfare democracies communitarianism has always been part of the political 
culture, especially through the important role played by Christian-Democratic parties. One 
reason for the neglect of these communitarian approaches might be that the “Third Way” 
discussions as well as the “communitarian” debates originated in Anglo-American cultural 
settings, which have never experienced Christian Democracy.  
Finally, we want to stress that policy preferences among political parties should not be 
taken as given or solely derived from assumed interests. Based on the “mandate theory” 
(Klingemann et al. 1994) we would assume that the enacted policies in the three countries 
would largely follow the programmatic approach outlined in their party programmes. Yet 
contrary, Hay and Watson (1999) argue that the communitarian elements in “New 
Labour's” rhetoric largely camouflaged its neo-liberal approach. In the next step of the 
research programme we will ask whether and in how far the policy positions developed in 
the party programmes have guided the material welfare state development in our three 
welfare democracies. 
                                                   
15  We are well aware that there is a broad spectrum of ‘different’ communitarian approaches. For brief 
overviews see Levitas (1998: 89-111) and Reese-Schäfer (1996). For a discussion of the concept of 
“family” among communitarian see Frazer (1999: 173-202). 
16  Also see Gilbert (2002). 
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Appendix  
Keynesian Demand Management 
Source: Party Manifesto Data (Budge et al. 2001) 
 
Welfare State Expansion 
Source: Party Manifesto Data (Budge et al. 2001) 
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